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1 Introduction 
1.1 Definition 
Over past centuries, technological improvements in agriculture have led to an increase in agricultural 
outputs, which reduced commodity prices worldwide. Due to the global nature of agricultural markets, 
prices are set at the world market. At the world market, less efficient producers are not able to 
compete in the long run at such low price levels. However, such producers often purely rely on income 
from agricultural production. Farmers are also exposed to highly volatile agricultural commodity prices 
at the world market, which may negatively influence farm economics, farmers income and livelihoods. 
Hence, interventions in agricultural markets in the form of pricing arrangements are often 
necessary to shield primary producers from price volatility and to ensure a fair distribution 
of margins among the different actors of the value chain. Pricing arrangements may come in 
different forms and be regulated by different actors. A pricing arrangements can define for 
example, a fixed price, minimum support price and price premium often linked to quality criteria. On 
the basis of actors involved in the regulation of these price interventions the following two main 
categories are distinguished in this write-up: 
 
Public and public-private interventions: Public interventions refer to interventions when 
the government intervenes in agricultural markets as part of a broader a broader agricultural 
policy and sets legally binding price restrictions or requirements (Kolavalli and Vigner, 2011; 
Tripathi, 2013). Often times, representatives of the private sector (e.g., representatives of 
producers, processing companies and exporters) are members of the organizations that set up 
price interventions, such as marketing boards of interprofessional organizations, and they are 
consulted in setting price levels. These interventions are referred as public-private 
interventions. In this write-up, these two type of interventions will be analysed together. 
Private interventions: Pricing arrangements are often part of private initiatives, such as 
third-party certification schemes (e.g., Fairtrade, UTZ, Organic) and schemes set up by 
private companies (e.g., Kenya Tea Development Agency; KTDA Ltd.). They can also be 
defined as part of contract agreements.  
 
The objectives of pricing interventions can be manifold and can change over time. Public and public-
private interventions aim to increase food security and price stability at domestic level, and to get 
sufficient income to farmers (Tripathi, 2013). The objectives of private interventions may also be 
diverse. Certification schemes usually aim to improve sustainability aspects of production, improve 
product quality, increase price levels at farm gate, improve the wellbeing of farmers and agricultural 
workers, and contribute to the reduction of poverty (eg. Fairtrade). Other private initiatives aim to 
play a role in sector governance, such as KTDA. Many of the pricing arrangements, regardless 
whether it is publicly or privately regulated, set targets to increase the farmers’ share of 
export prices (Molenaar et al., 2017). 
1.2 Theory of change 
According to the theory of change, pricing arrangements, such as minimum price guarantee and price 
premiums, lead to reduction of possible economic losses by cutting off the downside of the price 
distribution (i.e., downside risk) and more stable prices. By limiting this downside risk, farmers, that 
are usually risk-averse, are more willing to plan and invest in capital items and improved production 
technology. In the long run, investments result in improved production efficiency/yield and product 
quality. Improved efficiency leads to cost reductions and improved quality results in higher prices. 
Also, income stability reduces farmers' dependency on intermediaries, such as buyers/exporters. A 
higher financial certainty gives farmers more power in negotiating prices and choosing buyers. The 
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improvements in farm technology, product quality and the increase in farmers’ bargaining power 
result in higher net incomes, a sustainable growth of farm businesses leading to wealth accumulation 
and improved livelihood of smallholder farmers over time. 
1.3 Examples 
Some examples of typical price setting and price stabilization mechanisms found in the literature is 
provided below. Please note, certification schemes are not mentioned in this list as they are discussed 
in a specific certification intervention overview study1. 
• Cocoa and coffee in Ivory Coast: Coffee-Cocoa Council (CCC) sets the rules for the marketing 
of coffee and cocoa. The organization is governed by representatives of the government and 
cocoa and coffee industry and finance and insurance sector. Farm gate price is at least 60% of 
the export price (Molenaar et al., 2017). 
• Cocoa in Ghana: The Producer Price Committee of the state-owned marketing board 
(Cocobod) sets the producer price for cocoa at the beginning of the harvest season for the 
entire crop year. The price is based on the price Cocobod expects to receive, having already 
sold nearly 70 % of the crop. To this price, Cocobod adds the costs of its operations and the 
export tax to arrive at what it calls “net free on board (f.o.b.) price.” There is also a price 
stabilization fund to support farm gate prices (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011).  
• Coffee in Costa Rica: ICAFE is a state-sanctioned non-governmental organization, which 
represents the whole sector. Within this organization, a Liquidation Commission, which sets 
the prices, is established. The commission has two members from the ICAFE board (one 
represents the farmers and the other the washing stations) and one from the Economics and 
Trade Ministry (Molenaar et al., 2017). Famers receive 80% of export price. A price 
stabilization fund also operates, which compensate farmers when the price is below the cost 
of production by more than 2.5%.  
• Cotton in Burkina Faso: In Burkina Faso, the producer price for seed cotton is annually 
negotiated and set by interprofessional organization, the Interprofessional Cotton Association 
of Burkina Faso (AICB). This organization is governed by representatives of the Burkina 
government, three cotton companies and producer representatives. Burkina Faso’s seed 
cotton price setting formula is called the Smoothing Mechanism. In other words, farmers can 
potentially receive two payments: a floor price payment after they sell their seed cotton and a 
supplementary payment. Also, a price stabilization fund compensates ginning companies at 
the end of the season if they paid a higher fixed price to farmers than the final ex-post price 
(Bassett, 2014). 
• Cotton in Ivory Coast: Ivory Coast’s association, Intercoton, is a similar umbrella organization 
that brings producers and ginning companies together annually to negotiate prices. A new 
pricing mechanism for Ivory Coast was developed in 2009, popularly known as COWI, is a 
175-page document that provides sector actors with a formula for calculating the producer 
price for a kilogram of seed cotton. A critical component of this formula is the share of cotton 
revenues received by producers. Also, similar organizations exist in Mali and Cameroon 
(Theriault et al., 2013; Bassett, 2014). 
• Coffee in Columbia: FNC is a farmer governed organization that provides sector governance 
through different instruments. In the context of this write-up, instruments, such as 
guaranteed purchase, price protection contract and pay now for future delivery contract, are 
of interest. Guaranteed purchase means that farmers may sell their output at an established 
minimum price. Prices are set and communicated daily and act as a reference point for the 
entire market (Molenaar et al., 2017).  
• Tea in Kenya: KTDA is a vertically integrated private company that offers services for small 
tea farmers such as inputs and agri-extension, transportation, processing, marketing, and 
access to finance (IFC, 2014). KTDA farmers receive 75-80% of the final tea price, which is 
about three times higher than in other East-African countries. Farmers usually got ca. 12% 
                                                 
1 Emily Bouwman, 2018. Income Intervention Quick Scan: Certification, report number: WCDI-18-025, Wageningen Centre 
for Development Innovation, Wageningen, the Netherlands 
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higher prices for their tea compared to the average of all teas sold at the Mombasa Auction 
(Molenaar et al., 2017). 
1.4 Geography 
Pricing arrangements are implemented globally. Examples in the reviewed literature were found for 
countries, particularly in Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Cameroon, Kenya and Ivory Coast 
and in Latin-America, such as Cost Rica and Columbia. Also, there were references on pricing policies 
in the cotton sector in the US and China (Baffes, 2005). 
1.5 Role of actors 
Public and public-private interventions usually occur via marketing boards or 
interprofessional organizations. For example, in Ghana, the government intervenes through a 
state-owned marketing board (i.e., Cocobod) to shield farmers from price volatility. Farmers are 
offered a stable farm gate price for cocoa that meets minimum quality requirements. Quality 
requirements are important for being able to sell products to large industry players, such as 
Cadbury. Cadbury is known to exclusively use Ghanaian cocoa beans in all UK-retailed chocolate 
products. 
Private sector has a role in public-private interventions as representatives of agribusiness 
companies and also farmers are often involved in interprofessional organizations setting the price. 
Power relations, are however, generally skewed. Farmers’ negotiating power is often limited even 
when they are members of a price setting organization (Quarmine et al., 2012; Bassett , 2014). For 
example, up until March 2011, the seed cotton price in Burkina Faso was determined on the basis of 
six parameters. In the spring of 2011, world market prices reached record levels that year which 
resulted in a significant difference between the forecast price and the actual world price. The price 
setting mechanisms was, however, amended, which severely deteriorated farmers’ payments. Farmer 
union representatives on the cotton sector management committee were not sufficiently defending 
their interests during the 2011/12 price negotiations (Bassett , 2014) in Burkina Faso. Also, the 
negotiations in Ivory Coast during the same period illustrate the power of cotton companies to 
implement the price setting mechanism to their advantage. Similarly, cotton farmers in Zimbabwe 
claimed that the representative bodies for farmers have failed to sufficiently represent their interest 
(Muyeji, 2013). 
KTDA is owned by 54 private companies and have 550,000 smallholder tea farmers as 
shareholders. Farmers’ benefits are more visible in the case of this private sector initiative. For 
example, 30% of the KTDA’s profit has to be paid as bonus payments to the farmers (IFC, 2014).
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2 Summary and justification of assessment 
Strength of outcome 
Assessment criterion WUR 
score 
Rationale for score 
Scale: Size of the population 
intervention could impact and 
potential to scale to other contexts  High 
• All producers can, in principle, benefit from public price setting mechanisms, as they usually set price at 
sector level. Cocobod in Ghana and CCC in Costa Rica can reach around 800,000 smallholders. 
o Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011; Bassett, T.J., 2014; Molenaar et al., 2017 
• To benefit from pricing arrangements as part of private initiatives, farmers are usually required to join the 
scheme, e.g. KTDA is owned by 54 companies and has 550,000 smallholder tea farmers as shareholders. 
o Molenaar et al., 2017 
Impact: degree of increase in 
incomes 
Low 
• Very limited evidence on explicit income effect. In general, negative or slightly positive effect on income 
was indicated by reviewed studies. An annual growth of 5% in wheat producers income was indicated as a 
consequence of agricultural price policy in India. One study showed that farmers income can be negatively 
affected by price stabilization polices. Also, with regard to farm profitability, price setting mechanism may 
depress farm income. 
o Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011; Bassett, 2014; Tripathi, 2013; Jayne et al., 2001; Bassett, 2014 
• The value capture of export prices by farmers often increases. For example, KTDA farmers receive 75-
80% of export price, CCC farmers 60% and ICAFE farmers 80%. To what extent this contributes to a higher 
income is unclear. 
o ICF, 2014; Molenaar et al., 2017 
Sustainability: financial ability of 
farmer income increase to endure 
independent of ongoing external 
support 
Low • Price setting and price stabilization mechanisms have endured for decades, however no evidence found whether farmer income increase would last independent of ongoing financial support. 
Gender: Potential of intervention to 
positively impact women 
Low 
 
 
 
• There  is no evidence found whether pricing arrangements specifically targets women.  
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Strength of evidence 
Assessment criterion WUR 
score 
Rationale for score 
Breadth: amount of rigorous 
literature that exists on the impact 
of the intervention, as defined by 
the minimum quality of evidence 
for this paper 
Low 
• Not considering certification literature, no meta-studies were found. Studies cited in this overview were 
rather a description of the pricing mechanisms than an evaluation on their impact.  
o Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011; Bassett, 2014; Jayne et al., 2001; Tripathi, 2013; Moleanaar et al., 2007 
Consistency: Degree to which the 
studies reviewed are in agreement 
on the direction of impact  High 
• Not considering certification literature, regarding other private initiatives, KTDA showed an outstanding 
performance in terms of increase in farm profitability (profit was 10 times higher than in other 
neighboring countries), however this impact was not attributed to pricing, in particular. 
o ICF, 2014 
• In case of public and public-private pricing arrangements, negative or slightly positive impact on farmers’ 
income.  
o Bassett, 2014; Tripathi, 2013; Jayne et al., 2001 
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3 Methodology 
The reviewed literature on pricing arrangements overlaps with literature on certification, as pricing 
arrangements are often one of the key elements of such schemes/private standards. Certification-
related articles on pricing arrangements dominated the literature.  
 
In total, 50 scientific papers, industry reports and publications were found, which had some relevance 
to pricing (via Google Scholar and Google search). 20 out of 50 documents were related to 
certification. From this body of literature, studies that contained information particularly on the effect 
of pricing element of schemes rather than on the effect of being certified or not were investigated in 
more detail. The other 30 papers of the long list were, in general, related to issues, such as pricing 
and trade policies, market access and participation. No review studies focusing on the impact of 
various pricing arrangements have been found. 12 studies were consulted to draw conclusions on 
income and intermediate and other effects. Main sources used to draw conclusions on income effect, in 
particular are listed here: 
 
• Nelson and Pound, 2009:  Systematic analysis on the impact of Fairtrade. Over 80+ studies 
were reviewed.  Evidence base containing in-depth information was found to comprise 23 
reports containing 33 separate case studies, which have been analysed in detail. Although this 
study relates to certification, it was included here because it specifically draws conclusion on 
the income effect of guaranteed minimum price based on 29 studies. 
• Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011: Book chapter on the developments in the cocoa sector in Ghana. 
• Jayne et al., 2001: Analysis on how governmental efforts to support maize price levels affect 
farm households. Survey data on 18 districts in 1997 and 1998 including 1540 households in 
1997 and 612 households in 1998. 
• Tripathi, 2013: Study examining the effectiveness of procurement prices in getting sufficient 
income to the farmers in India (wheat and rice sectors). 
• Muyeji, 2013: Study analysing the impact of contract farming. 
• Bassett, T.J. 2014: Qualitative study on the cotton industry in West Africa 
• Molenaar et al., 2017: Report on improving the performance of agricultural commodity sectors 
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4 Impact 
4.1 Public and private interventions 
Looking at the detailed findings below, evidence suggests that public and public-private price 
interventions have negative or slightly positive impact on farmers’ income mainly due to costs 
outpacing revenues and farmers’ low power in price setting negotiations. Regarding farm profitability 
and price levels, it can be concluded that the impact of pricing arrangements is similar to that on 
farmers’ income. There is some evidence in cocoa farming that other uses of labor may result in 
higher revenues. Some of the public-private schemes, such as CCC and ICAFE, set targets in terms of 
farmers’ share in export prices, which implies a higher share for farmers than they would receive 
without price setting policies. It can be assumed that getting a higher share of export prices will 
positively influence farmers’ income, however explicit evidence in literature is lacking regarding the 
relationship between higher value capture of prices and farmers’ income. 
 
4.1.1 Effect on income 
• Jayne et al., 2001 evaluated the potential impact of high maize prices in Kenya in relation to 
the reintroduction of state-run marketing board into grain purchase at fixed support prices, 
coupled with tariffs on maize imports, as part of their protectionist policy against downside 
price risks. The study argues that most rural farmers are net buyers of maize, hence they are 
directly hurt by high maize prices. Further, they conclude that maize import tariffs act as a tax 
on rural poor because low-income households are more likely to be net buyers of maize than 
high-income households. This finding is specific to subsistence crop and such policy may have 
different implications for cash crops, such as tea, coffee, and cocoa.   
• In the spring of 2011, world market prices reached record levels that year which resulted in a 
significant difference between the forecast price and the actual world price. The 
Interprofessional Cotton Association of Burkina Faso had amended the price setting 
mechanism in March 2011 at the peak of the cotton boom. Hence, the supplementary 
payment provision in the smoothing mechanism was not applied as anticipated in Burkina 
Faso. This resulted that some of the highest world price months were not included in this 
critical calculation. As a consequence, supplementary payments were calculated on a lower 
world market price, which depressed farmer incomes. In this case, farmers were 
compensating cotton companies for their failure to sell cotton during those months when 
market prices were high (Bassett, 2014). It was estimated that farmer payments were 
reduced by 39% in 2010–11 as a result of the formula changes. Also, the 2011–12 floor price 
for seed cotton had been lowered as a result of changes made to calculating the forecast 
price. The new forecasting method eliminated the months in the previous 14 months when 
cotton companies sold less than 1% of total production. 
• In 1980, in India, policies changed from maximizing food grain production to ensure a 
diversified production pattern that matches the demands of Indian market (Tripathi, 2013). 
The main instruments of this policy was 1) minimum support price for farmers, 2) inter and 
intra-year price stability through open market operations, 3) maintaining buffer stock, 4) 
distributing food grains at reasonable prices through the public distribution system. As a result 
of the new price policy, during pre-reform period 1981/82 to 1992/93 farm income in wheat 
cultivation increased from INR 148/ha to INR 261/ha, indicating an annual growth of 5.29%. 
• In 1991, economic reforms were introduced in India (Tripathi, 2013). During the post-reform 
period, government cut major input subsidies, and no longer aimed to intervene in the 
production/procurement/distribution of farm inputs. In this period, price policy was considered 
to have a significant role in providing safety net to farmers. During the first years of the post-
reform period, wheat prices fluctuated widely, however the trend in net farm income was 
positive. After a sharp decline in prices from INR 347/ha to INR 164/ha in the period 
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1999/2000 to 2004/05, net farm income recovered and reached INR 326/ha by 2009/10. This 
significant improvement in farm income can, however, partly be attributed to development 
programs to revive agricultural growth introduced in the mid-2000s in India. 
4.1.2 Intermediate and other effect 
Farm profitability and price levels  
• The paper describing the price interventions in Ghana (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2011) cites 
several models, which estimate the sensitivity of production supply to farm gate prices. Based 
on these studies, it can be concluded that small-scale cocoa producers in Ghana have 
responded positively to these price incentives, i.e., cocoa production increased in the short-
run due to higher farm gate prices. Data on cocoa returns as a result of this intervention is 
limited. The paper includes two rural surveys, one conducted in 1996 (Agrisystems Ltd., 
1997) and one in 2006 (Barrientos and Asenso-Okyere, 2008). These studies found that cocoa 
production has not become more profitable for farmers. More specifically, results show that 
cocoa, which usually is the largest source of earnings in cocoa-producing households, 
accounting for more than 67 percent of revenues, has actually declined over time: net cocoa 
profits for cocoa-producing households were 7 percent lower in 2005 than in 1996. Although, 
the real price of cocoa increased by 47 percent between these two years, the cost of inputs 
increased more. The extent to which these changes in profitability can be attributed to the 
Ghanaian pricing policy is unclear. 
• Despite of seemingly favourable pricing arrangements, cocoa farmers in Ghana face an 
income problem, hence they reluctant to invest in quality-enhancing practices (Quarmine et 
al., 2012). Qaurmine et al., 2012 illustrates that the economic position of farmers is fragile 
potentially due to two reasons: 1) relatively low revenue of cocoa farming compared to other 
uses of labour and 2) high cost of renting land. 
• In contrast to wheat cultivation, a negative trend in farm profitability was observed in rice 
production during post-reform period in India (after 1991) (Tripathi, 2013). Net farm 
profitability declined by 10% per year till 2002/03. From 2004/05 to 2009/10, net profitability 
of rice production, however, increased by a rate of 36% per year, reaching the level of INR 
249/ha in 2009/10. Despite this increase in rice prices, there is still a considerable difference 
between rice and wheat cultivation. While rice farmers received only 14% returns on total 
production costs between 2004/05- and 2009/10, wheat cultivation got 33 % net returns over 
costs during the same period. 
• Pricing arrangements often set requirements in terms of the share of export price received by 
farmers. For example, CCC and ICAFE sets prices that farmers receive at least 60% of cocoa 
export price and 80% of coffee export price, respectively (Moleanaar et al., 2007). 
4.2 Private interventions 
Findings on income effect of pricing arrangements as part of private initiatives are limited. Although, 
certification literature was not subject of this overview the main conclusions of the specific study on 
certification are also presented here. Overall, certification is shown to have a neutral or positive 
impact on farmers income. The private initiative KTDA seem to be successful in getting higher share 
of export prices to farmers, and this business model had a very positive impact on farm profits, i.e., 
profit of smallholder tea farmers participating in KTDA was ca. 10 times higher than in other 
neighboring countries. However, this impact was not attributed to pricing, in particular, but to 
factors, such as farmers collective ownership of processing and the quality of plucking and of made tea 
as a result of training and access to inputs. Evidence on the effect of pricing arrangements as a 
part of contracts is mixed. Despite of pre-agreed producer prices farmers often not benefit from the 
contracts because input prices are usually higher under contract agreements. 
4.2.1 Effect on income 
• A review of Fairtrade certification by Nelson and Pound (2009) referred to 29 studies, which 
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show that guaranteed minimum price leads to improved income. The study, however, 
did not quantify the extent of improvement in income, nor specified whether income refers to 
farm income or household income. 
• The main conclusion of the specific certification intervention overview study is included here 
as pricing is often one of the elements of certification schemes. The overview study concludes 
that the overall effect of certification is an increase in farmers’ income when looking at net 
and gross income together (average increase 11%, range from 2% to 20%.) 
Removing studies reporting on gross income, the effect of certification is still positive, 
however not statistically significant. However, the study also underlies that the meta-analysis, 
which above conclusion is based on, was restricted by an insufficient number of effect sizes 
per outcome to reach any robust conclusion. The effect from certifying coffee products on 
farmer income is neutral in most cases. One cocoa-study shows that participation in a 
certified Organic contract scheme leads to increases net cocoa (and vanilla) revenues by, 
on average, 150%. Two fruit and vegetable studies show that certification has a 
neutral effect on income.  
4.2.2 Intermediate and other effect 
Farm profitability, price levels and yield 
• The Kenya Tea Development Agency Ltd (KTDA) introduced an inclusive business model in the 
tea industry in Kenya. KTDA is owned by 54 tea companies and have 550,000 small tea 
farmers as individual shareholders (IFC, 2014). KTDA farmers receive 75-80% of the final 
tea price. That is, a producer share of made tea prices about three times higher than 
other East-African countries (Molenaar et al., 2017). In 2009, the profit of smallholder tea 
farmers participating in KTDA was ca. 10 times higher than in other neighboring countries 
(Molenaar et al., 2017). Main factors that contribute to this high profit are farmers collective 
ownership of processing and the quality of plucking and of made tea as a result of training 
and access to inputs. 
• KTDA trains farmers on certification standards, which enables smallholders to participate in 
certification schemes. Producing according to sustainable practices and selling products as 
certified enabled farmers to increase yields by 36% on average and receive premiums for 
certified tea (Molenaar et al., 2017). 
• After the privatization of the government owned cotton company (COTTCO), the cotton 
industry has opened up to competition in Zimbabwe. Cargill entered the market and 
introduced the cash payment system. Due to the increased competition, COTTCO also 
shifted towards the cash payment system. Before the market liberalization the producer price 
of seed cotton used to be 58% of the international price. After the liberalization 
however, the domestic price increased to 79% of the international price (Muyeji, 
2013). 
• In Zimbabwe, almost 99% of seed cotton production occurs under contract farming (Muyeji, 
2013). Contracts usually include four main elements, i.e., pre-agreed price, quality, quantity 
and time. Muyeji, 2013 suggests that independent cotton farmer makes an extra 
earning of ca. UD$34 compared to a farmer under a specific contract scheme. This is 
explained by the fact that non-contracted farmer can access inputs cheaper because of 
flexibility in timing of procurement and application of inputs, opportunities to benefit from 
input discount sales promotions and from input support schemes. Also, margins of non-
contracted farmers may further improve as  they capitalize on economies of scale.  
• Kumar et al., 2016 found a significant positive effect of contract farming on farmer’s income. 
The study shows that on average contract farmers realize a 40% higher profit than 
independent ginger farmers in Nepal.  
• Ragasa et al. 2018 found that maize production under contract farming in Ghana was 
less profitable compared to farming without contract. This difference is explained by the 
much higher input prices under contract farming and that producer prices paid by 
scheme operators are, in some instances, even lower than the market price in the 
community. Further, the study underlies that 56% of the with-scheme farmers have negative 
profits, and the impact on profits of scheme participation in the 2014–15 cropping seasons is 
negative. 
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Food safety 
• Kumar et al., 2016 found a significant positive effect of contract farming on the adoption of 
food safety measures among ginger farmers in Nepal. Contract farmers are 7% more 
likely to adopt food safety measures compared to farmers producing without a contract. 
Community impact 
Nelson and Pound (2009) in their review on the Fairtrade certification scheme explored the impact 
of investments that were financed by the Fairtrade social premium and presented anecdotal 
cases. 
– Kuapa Kokoo and Day Chocolate initiative 
Nelson and Pound (2009) refer to study of Ronchi (2002), which found that locals were very 
positive about the impact of this Fairtrade initiative. 
• “Ca.100,000 people have received medical attention and prescriptions, yet the 
programme costs only 2% of the Fairtrade premium earned on Day Chocolate purchases 
alone.” 
• “41 of the 53 community projects of the Kuapa Kokoo Farmers Trust have been 
funded by Fairtrade premium earnings. The quality of water and sanitation 
projects is highly appreciated by community members.” 
• “School building project had ‘emphatically’ improved school attendance, health and the 
quality of education.” 
 
– Windward Islands Bananas 
• Considerable in scale, premiums returned to Windward Islands communities reached 
nearly US $1.3 million from sales between July 2000 and April 2003. Out of this fund 
nearly US $750,000 was used by Fairtrade producer groups to invest in development 
projects 
• Investments include:  
 purchase of weedeater machinery to replace herbicides on members’ farmers; 
 wide array of community projects: buying equipment, putting up buildings for 
schools, improvement of roads, and vocational training programs for village youth; a 
novel health insurance fund in St Lucia to reimburse Fairtrade farmers and families for 
medical expenses up to EC $1,000 (US $375) and for secondary school attendance 
for youth in rural areas. 
–  Fairtrade coffee, Nicaragua   
• The SOPPEXCCA co-operative has invested Fairtrade premium funds into small 
improvements in community infrastructure and services, such as building a 
baseball field and equipment, school building improvements. 
• Disjointed use of funds: The funds could not cover larger community infrastructure 
and services work (Bacon, 2005 referred by Nelson and Pound (2009)) 
The above examples illustrate the importance of cooperatives in realizing tangible 
benefits for the community using Fairtrade premium funds. Further, Nelson and Pound 
(2009) suggest that a more coordinated use of Fairtrade premium would scale up the 
impact of funds.  
4.3 Applicability of impact 
Gender 
No evidence found in relation to gender-differentiated impact. 
Farmer segments 
This intervention does usually not target specific value chains. Pricing arrangements exist across 
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various value chains, such as cotton, coffee, cocoa, tea, maize. 
Pre-commercial and commercial farmers are most affected by pricing arrangements as they seek 
to sell their products on the market. Price setting/stabilization mechanisms can reach large number of 
farmers. FNC, the smallholder led federation, has 563,000 members. ICAFE in Costa Rica gathers 
78,000 coffee growers. Cocobod and CCC, both can reach around 800,000 smallholders. KTDA in 
Kenya has 543,000 smallholders as shareholders. 
Agribusiness companies are also affected as they buy these product. Farmers and agribusiness 
companies have opposing interests as farmers seek to earn the highest price  for their products, while 
agribusiness companies would generally like to pay lower prices. Some of the initiative that intervenes 
in pricing also set targets with regard to the distribution of margins in the sector (e.g., ICAFE in 
Costa Rica) (Molenaar et al., 2017). 
It can be hypothesized that reduction of downside risk may be of greater importance to stimulate 
investments of smallholder farmers compared to large commercial farms. Hence, pricing 
arrangements, such as minimum price can have a more substantial role for smallholder farmers.  
According to risk theory, risk aversion decreases as wealth increases (assuming a logarithmic utility 
function) (Hardaker et al., 2015). On this basis, smallholder farmers may be more risk averse as they 
have little financial buffer compared to large farms which possess an accumulated equity that enables 
them to manage investment risks. Hence, by increasing the financial buffer of smallholder farmers, 
their risk aversion may decrease to a larger extent relative to that of large scale commercial farmers. 
Hence, pricing arrangements may have a relatively larger impact at smallholder level compared to 
commercial farms. In contrast to this theory, however, evidence also illustrates that in some cases 
low-income households are directly hurt by supporting price policies. Whereas high-income 
households may benefit from policies that aim to keep commodity prices higher (Jayne et al., 2001).  
Food pricing policies are often used to benefit the urban population as they particularly public 
employees and the military and they may have a disproportionate political influence at the expense 
of farmers (Mellor and Ahmed, 1988).  
4.4 Enhancing the intervention 
Linking pricing arrangements to quality criteria can be important when finding buyers for the 
products. For example, the fixed farm gate price for cocoa in Ghana is linked to minimum quality 
criteria, which is beneficial for trade with the large industry player Cadbury. However, improved trade 
does not mean better farmer income. Also, CCC in Ivory Coast implements a strict quality control 
system. As a result of selling high quality beans, both Ghana and Ivory Coast are able to sell cocoa 
beans with a price premium (Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2012; Molenaar et al., 2017). 
 
Imposing levy on export prices can have a positive impact on the sustainability of stabilization 
funds run by price-setting organizations and on the financial sustainability of these organizations. 
More specifically, Cocobod in Ghana imposes a levy on export price to capitalize its price stabilization 
fund. ICAFE in Costa Rica also installs a levy of 1.2% to contribute to its running costs, investments in 
research, quality management and market promotion (Molenaar et al. 2017). 
 
Molenaar et al., 2017 suggest that the combination of price setting, stabilization, supply chain 
transparency, and quality management system leads to high yields, high quality in the coffee 
sector in Costa Rica and premium prices on the world market. 
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5 Key success factors 
Setting proper price level 
- Floor price must be carefully set to take into account costs of production and the potential 
differences in these costs depending weather scenarios, regional and world market conditions, 
and poverty alleviation objectives (Jayne et al., 2001). 
- Jayne et al., 2001 emphasize the importance of context when implementing commodity 
pricing and trade policies. Farmers should not be regarded as a homogenous group because 
there are differences in assets, the crops from which household income is derived, and food 
expenditure patterns. Hence, to achieve the desired impact with commodity pricing and trade 
policy, solid empirical information is needed with regard to these characteristics. Policies 
should be tailored based on these differences across farmers. 
Increasing productivity at farm and investments in the supply chain 
- Kilian et al., 2006 outlines the importance of farm management versus price premiums for 
the economic success of the farm. The study shows that best-managed conventional farms 
were able to produce coffee for around 51 US cents/lb, achieving net farms incomes, poorly 
managed farms faced average costs of around 77 US cents/lb, leading to an income loss of 17 
US cents/lb of produced coffee. In the case of organic farms, the income gap has been shown 
to be even wider. The most efficient organic farms in Costa Rica were able to produce organic 
coffee for slightly more than 1 US$/lb with a net income of 18 US cents/lb. At the same time, 
production costs in the less-efficient organic farms amounted for nearly 1.60 US cents/lb, 
hence an income loss of 35US cents/lb. 
- Fixed price policy can increase trust among industry stakeholders, however can have a 
negative effect on supply chain investments. The fixed price policy of CCC (Cocoa in 
Ivory Coast) has reduced margins in the middle segment of the supply chain. Hence, these 
investments are highly dependent on the global industry and donors (Molenaar et al., 2017). 
Increasing market competitions 
- Competition in the processing industry would be desired. For example, the oligopsonistic 
structure of cotton economies in Burkina Faso, i.e., there are so few purchaser companies 
that their actions can materially affect price, favours the cotton companies over producers 
(Bassett, 2014). By Cargill entering the cotton market in Zimbabwe, competition has 
increased and the domestic cotton price rose from 58% of the international market price to 
79% of the international market price (Muyeji, 2013). 
- Prices increases should be implemented sector-wide (e.g. by all major buyers within a 
sector or by a public institution managing the crop) rather than by a selected few. Price 
increases should primarily occur by strengthening the competitiveness of the sector 
as a whole. For example, in the Malawi 2020 initiative: tea prices and wages to plantation 
workers have been increased through efficiency and quality improvements. In turn, the whole 
country’s tea sector was able to remain competitive on world markets. 
Adding value to the product 
- Creating market conditions under which prices will rise, e.g. through supporting 
farmers to improve quality standards, offer more value-added services, increase market 
competition. For example, Fairtrade farmers add value to their coffee beans as the beans are 
milled at the Fairtrade cooperative mills and consequently, are sold in the form of ‘green 
beans’. Whereas UTZ farmers sell beans in the ‘kiboko’ stage and non-certified farmers sell 
their beans as ‘red cherries’ or ‘kiboko’. Fairtrade farmers are getting a higher price for their 
goods partly due to this value addition process (Chiputwa et al., 2015). 
- If price premiums is not linked to quality or other commercial criteria, it is often 
insufficient to lift farmers out of poverty. For example, Kilian et al., 2006 illustrates the 
important link between price premiums and quality improvements. The study underlies, in the 
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context of coffee production, that due to the further development of sustainable markets 
competition has already begun to increase. Hence, farmers are obliged to increase their 
productivity and quality. They conclude that the benefits/price premiums that farmers 
currently receive should at least be partly invested in improving production efficiency and 
quality. Otherwise, farmers cannot remain competitive on the market in the long run. 
Increasing market power among farmers and trust through the supply chain 
- Increasing farmer’s bargaining power is essential for them to be able to benefit from 
price setting mechanisms (see previous examples from cotton industry) (Bassett, 2014). Well-
organized farmer’s unions/groups with representatives, which are knowledgeable of the 
industry, are necessary. 
- Establishing direct and transparent trading relationship that details the criteria for the 
price increases and the expectations of both buyer and supplier. 
- Timing of announcing the new prices for crops is crucial. Quarmine et al., 2012 explained 
that timing of price announcement by Cocobod in Ghana varies season by season. 
Sometimes, farmers have to sell their cocoa at prices of the previous year. These delays in 
price announcement have a negative impact on their income as new prices are usually higher 
than prices of previous year. 
- Preventing rent-seeking activities by the buying companies of crops is of importance. The 
Produce Buying Company of cocoa beans (LBC, subsidiary of Cocobod) in Ghana adjusts their 
scale in their favour. As a consequence they obtain more cocoa beans at the going price, 
which has a negative impact on farmers financial position (Quarmine et al., 2012). 
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6 Barriers addressed 
Pricing interventions aim to mitigate high price volatility and to protect farmers from cheap imports, 
thereby stabilize farmers’ income. Also, this intervention aims to increase price levels for farmers and 
to provide a fair price for products. 
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7 Questions for further research 
• Quantitative evidence on the effect of pricing arrangements initiated by public or private 
bodies on farmers income/household income and livelihood is limited. Comparative studies 
are needed on the construction of price setting mechanisms, their implementation and 
impact. 
• The effect of private pricing arrangements is hardly evaluated as a separate 
intervention. Rather the global effect of agricultural policies and certification schemes is 
assessed by the majority of studies. 
• Impact studies rarely have random samples and experimental designs with control 
and treatment group. They usually present evidence for separate cases, using data 
reflective to a particular point of time rather than data over a period of time. 
• Cost of production can vary depending on several factors such as scale of production, 
geographical differences. Research on the realistic/average cost of production is needed 
to be able to develop effective pricing arrangements (eg. minimum floor price that truly 
covers the cost of production at farm level).  
• Impact studies on pricing arrangements rarely have random samples and experimental 
designs with control and treatment group. They usually present evidence for separate 
cases, using data reflective to a particular point of time rather than data over a period of time. 
• Cost of production can vary depending on several factors such as scale of production, 
geographical differences. Research on the realistic/average cost of production is needed 
to be able to develop effective pricing arrangements (eg. minimum floor price that truly 
covers the cost of production at farm level). 
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